Prethodna godina je gotovo cijela protekla uz bojkot rada Skupštine Crne Gore od strane kompletne opozicije, a krajem godine jednog njenog dijela. U takvim okolnostima došlo je do značajnog pada u kvalitetu rada parlamenta koji se posebno osjetio u vršenju kontrolne funkcije. Uočljiv je drastičan pad u korišćenju instrumenata koji stoje na raspolaganju poslanicima za kontrolu rada izvršne vlasti. Tako je u 2017. godini broj kontrolnih saslušanja bio manji za čak 90% u odnosu na 2016. Treba uzeti u obzir da je u međuvremenu privremeni odbor za nadzor nad istragama slučajeva ugrožavanja bezbjednosti novinara i medijskih kuća, koji je sproveo jedno kontrolno saslušanje, prestao da postoji, ali to ne mijenja činjenicu da je nivo redukcije broja saslušanja mnogo veći nego što bi se to moglo očekivati u redovnim okolnostima. Još jedan indikator promjene u vršenju kontrolne funkcije je i sprovođenje kontrolnog saslušanja od strane samo jednog odbora u 2017. godini, Odbora za međunarodne odnose i iseljenike, dok je godinu ranije ovaj kontrolni mehanizam iskoristilo njih šest. Napominjemo i da je jedino kontrolno saslušanje prethodne godine rezultiralo isključivo tehničkim zaključcima. Ovo je vrlo ilustrativan primjer negativnog uticaja opozicionog bojkota na kontrolnu funkciju parlamenta, posebno ako se uzme u obzir da je više od polovine kontrolnih saslušanja u 2016. godini sprovedeno u odborima kojima su predsjedavali predstavnici opozicionih partija.
Broj konsultativnih saslušanja u 2017. godini, kao što se može vidjeti iz grafika, je ostao na približnom nivou kao i prethodnih godina.
Kako bi smo još bolje približili vršenje kontrolne funkcije Skupštine Crne Gore, fokusiraćemo se na djelovanje dva odbora koji su vrlo dobri indikatori generalne slike o radu parlamenta u 2017. godini. U pitanju su Odbor za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet i Odbor za politički sistem, pravosuđe i upravu. Još jedan razlog zbog kojeg smo odlučili da uzmemo primjer ova dva odbora je što omogućavaju poređenje između odbora kojima su predsjedavali poslanici vladajuće većine i onih na čijem su čelu bili opozicioni poslanici.
Najbolji primjer za razumijevanje promjene u pristupu kontrolnoj funkciji Skupštine predstavlja Odbor za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet. U prethodnoj godini ovaj odbor nije održao nijedno kontrolno saslušanje. Da podsjetimo, Odbor su činili isključivo poslanici vladajuće koalicije. Ukoliko to uporedimo sa 2016. godinom, kada ne samo da su opozicioni poslanici aktivno učestvovali u radu odbora, već je i na samom čelu odbora bio predstavnik opozicije primjetićemo značajnu razliku. Naime ovaj Odbor je održao 5 kontrolnih saslušanja u 2016. godini, dakle polovinu od ukupnog broja održanih saslušanja. Uz to, na svim saslušanjima su učestvovali i ministri u Vladi, i to finansija, kulture, zdravstva, održivog razvoja i turizma. Prema tome, očigledno je u ovom odboru došlo do jasnog pada zainteresovanosti za vršenje kontrole nad radom izvršne vlasti. Odbor za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet je održao tri konsultativna saslušanja, što je predstavlja rast u odnosu na godinu ranije, s tim što su dva od ta tri saslušanja dio zakonom predviđene procedure za imenovanje na javnu funkciju. Preostalo saslušanje koje je bilo tematskog karaktera, odbor nije realizovao sam, već na zajedničkoj sjednici sa Odborom za turizam, poljoprivredu, ekologiju i prostorno planiranje.
Sa druge strane, na primjeru Odbora za politički sistem, pravosuđe i upravu možemo vidjeti da su odstupanja u radu manja kod onih odbora koje su i u ranijem periodu, prije opozicionog bojkota, vodili poslanici vladajuće većine. Ipak, nedostatak korektivnog faktora je vidljiv i u ovom slučaju, pa je tako 2017. godina bila jedina u posljednjih pet u kojoj ovaj odbor nije održao nijedno kontrolno saslušanje. Odbor je sproveo jedno konsultativno saslušanje, koje je, takođe, dio obavezne zakonske procedure za imenovanje na javnu funkciju.
Da je došlo do značajnog pada kvaliteta sprovođenja kontrolne funkcije Skupštine pokazuju i zaključci koje su odbori usvajali i predlagali plenumu na konačno usvajanje. Kad to kažemo, mislimo i na broj, ali prije svega na kvalitet samih zaključaka.[1] Ponovo kao najbolji primjer možemo uzeti Odbor za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet. Ukupan broj zaključaka koji je usvojen u 2017. godini je manji za više od 2/3 u odnosu na godinu prije nje. Tome su dva razloga. Prvi je da, kao što je već istaknuto, u 2017. godini nije bilo kontrolnih saslušanja, dok ih je godinu ranije bilo pet. Drugi razlog je da je svako razmatranje izvještaja o radu institucija, o kojem se odbor izjašnjavao, pratio po jedan zaključak kojim se samo konstatuje usvajanje ili prihvatanje izvještaja. To je praksa koja se razlikuje od one iz prethodnog saziva parlamenta, kada je odbor, gotovo po pravilu, donosio konkretne zaključke od suštinskog značaja za unapređenje rada institucija i to dominanto na osnovu prijedloga i insistiranja opozicionih poslanika. Kao ilustrativan primjer možemo navesti razmatranje izvještaja o radu Komisije za koncesije. U 2016. godini je rasprava o tom izvještaju završena uz sedam zaključaka, koje su predložila dva opoziciona poslanika, a koji se tiču direktno unaprjeđenja rada Komisije ili stanja u oblasti koncesija. U 2017. godini Odbor se nije čak ni izjasnio o zaključcima prilikom razmatranja izvještaja Komisije.
Kao i kod saslušanja, razlika je manje osjetna u odborima kojima je i prije bojkota predsjedavao neko od poslanika iz vladajuće većine. Tako je Odbor za politički sistem, pravosuđe i upravu usvojio i jedan zaključak više nego godinu ranije. Ipak, analizom sadržine tih zaključaka, postavlja se pitanje koliko oni zapravo doprinose poboljšanju rada institucija, jer su dominatno sačinjeni od uopštenih konstatacija.
Možemo, dakle, zaključiti da 2017. nije bila godina u kojoj je Skupština na kvalitetan i efikasan način vršila kontrolu rada ostalih grana vlasti. Naprotiv, uglavnom su svi izvještaji o radu institucija prolazili kroz skupštinske odbore bez konstruktivne rasprave, dok su saslušanja, uz rijetke izuzetke, predstavljala samo proceduralnu formalnost. Negativan efekat bojkota rada parlamenta od strane opozicije je naročito vidljiv u onim tijelima kojima su u prethodnom periodu predsjedavali poslanici opozicije. Sve je to rezultiralo nedostatkom prave kontrole nad institucijama koje bez efikasnog korišćenja mehanizama parlamentarnog nadzora ne mogu postati odgovornije i kvalitetnije.
Filip Vicković
Istraživač u Politikon mreži
[1] Treba napomenuti da kada govorimo o broju zaključaka, tretiramo ih zajedno, bez odvajanja, zaključke sa saslušanja i zaključke sa razmatranja izvještaja o radu i drugih dokumenata.
Naslovna fotografija: zvanična internet prezentacija Skupštine Crne Gore
***
The previous year was marked by the boycott of the Parliament by the whole opposition, and at the end of the year by part of it. In these circumstances, the Parliament has seen a downgrade in the quality of how it operates, which was most evident in how it exercise its control function. A fall in instrument usage that are at the disposal for MPs for supervising the work of the legislative branch is noticeable. The number of control hearings in 2017 has fallen by 90% when compared to 2016. What needs to be taken into consideration is that in the meantime the interim committee, which supervised investigations related to cases of threats to security of journalists and media, had one control hearing and eventually ceased to exist. In all means, this does not change the fact that the reduction of the number of hearings is much higher than one would expect in regular circumstances. Another indicator that shows changes in how the Parliament is performing its control function is the implementation of control hearings by only one committee in 2017, namely the Committee for international relations and emigrants, which is downgrade from 6 committees that used this control mechanism in 2016. We note that even the only control hearing during the last year resulted in solely technical conclusions. This is a very illustrative example of the negative effect caused by the opposition boycott on the control function of the Parliament, especially if one takes into consideration that more than half of the control hearings in 2016 were done in committees which were chaired by opposition MPs.
The number of consultative hearings in 2017, as it can be seen in the graphic below, has remained at almost the same level as during the previous years.
In the effort to elaborate how the Parliament of Montenegro performs its control function, we will focus on the performance of two committees in 2017. These are the Committee for economy, finance and budget and Committee for the political system, judiciary and administration. Another reason for choosing these two committees is the possibility for comparison between the committees where the MPs of the ruling majority and opposition chaired.
The best example for understanding how the control function of the parliament changed is the Committee for economy, finance and budget. In the last year, this committee hasn’t held a single control hearing. This committee consisted of only MPs from the ruling coalition. If we compare this to 2016, when not only the opposition MPs were active, but also the president of the committee was from the opposition, there are significant difference to be seen. In 2016, this committee has had 5 control hearings, which accounted half of the overall number of hearings. With that, on all hearings there were government ministers present, most notably ministers for culture, health care, sustainable development and tourism. Therefore, it is evident that there has been a clear fall in the interest for performing the control on the legislative branch. Committee for economy, finance and budget has held three consultative hearings, which is an increase compared to the year before, albeit two of those three were part of the legal procedure intended for appointments on public positions. The remaining hearing was more of a thematic character, which the committee organised together with the Committee for tourism, agriculture, ecology and spatial planning.
On the other hand, on the example of the Committee for the political system, judiciary and administration, one can notice less deviation in those committees that were, even before the boycott of the opposition, led by the MPs of the ruling majority. However, the lack of corrective factor is noticeable in this example too, hence why 2017 was the only in the last five years in which this committee hasn’t held a single control hearing. Chamber has held one consultative hearing, which is also part of the mandatory legal procedure for appointments on public positions.
To further elaborate on how the parliament has seen a downgrade in the quality of exercising its control function, we will take a look on the conclusions that the committees adopted and suggested on plenums for final adoption. This refers to the number, as well as the quality of the conclusions. The best example can be found in the Committee for economy, finance and budget. The overall number of conclusions adopted in 2017 is down by one-third when compared with the previous year. There are two reasons that prove this. First of all, as it was already mentioned, in 2017 there were no control hearings, whereas in 2016 there were five. The second reason is that every report on how the institutions operated, on which the committee declared its opinion, was followed by one conclusion which only stated that the report is either adopted or accepted. That differs significantly from the praxis of the previous parliament convocation, when the committee passed concrete conclusion off substantial importance for improving the work of institutions, which were dominantly proposed by opposition MPs. A great example for this can been seen when the report when the work of the Commission for concessions was discussed. In 2016, the discussion about this report led to seven conclusions, which were proposed by two opposition MPs that were intended for further improvement of the work of the Commission or the current state of affairs in the field of concessions. In 2017 however, the Committee hasn’t even come out with the conclusions that were made during the discussion about the report on the Commission.
As with the hearings, there is less noticeable difference in those committees which were, even before the opposition boycott, chaired by MPs from the ruling coalition. Therefore, Committee for the political system, judiciary and administration has adopted one conclusion more than the year before. However, when analysing the contents of these conclusions, one must take into consideration on how they contribute to the betterment of the work of institutions, since they are dominantly composed of generalised statements.
Therefore, we can conclude that 2017 wasn’t a year in which the Parliament hasn’t, at least in a quality or efficient way, performed its control function over the other government branches. On the contrary, the reports on the work of institutions passed through parliament committees without constructive debates, whereas the hearings, with rare exceptions, were just a procedural formality. The negative effect caused by the opposition boycott of the parliament was especially evident in those committees where opposition MPs used to chair. This is all thanks to the lack of real control over the institutions, which without the efficient use of mechanisms of parliament supervision, won’t become more responsible and developed.
Filip Vicković
Researcher at Politikon Network
Cover: official internet presentation of the Parliament of Montenegro
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Prethodna godina je gotovo cijela protekla uz bojkot rada Skupštine Crne Gore od strane kompletne opozicije, a krajem godine jednog njenog dijela. U takvim okolnostima došlo je do značajnog pada u kvalitetu rada parlamenta koji se posebno osjetio u vršenju kontrolne funkcije. Uočljiv je drastičan pad u korišćenju instrumenata koji stoje na raspolaganju poslanicima za kontrolu rada izvršne vlasti. Tako je u 2017. godini broj kontrolnih saslušanja bio manji za čak 90% u odnosu na 2016. Treba uzeti u obzir da je u međuvremenu privremeni odbor za nadzor nad istragama slučajeva ugrožavanja bezbjednosti novinara i medijskih kuća, koji je sproveo jedno kontrolno saslušanje, prestao da postoji, ali to ne mijenja činjenicu da je nivo redukcije broja saslušanja mnogo veći nego što bi se to moglo očekivati u redovnim okolnostima. Još jedan indikator promjene u vršenju kontrolne funkcije je i sprovođenje kontrolnog saslušanja od strane samo jednog odbora u 2017. godini, Odbora za međunarodne odnose i iseljenike, dok je godinu ranije ovaj kontrolni mehanizam iskoristilo njih šest. Napominjemo i da je jedino kontrolno saslušanje prethodne godine rezultiralo isključivo tehničkim zaključcima. Ovo je vrlo ilustrativan primjer negativnog uticaja opozicionog bojkota na kontrolnu funkciju parlamenta, posebno ako se uzme u obzir da je više od polovine kontrolnih saslušanja u 2016. godini sprovedeno u odborima kojima su predsjedavali predstavnici opozicionih partija.
Broj konsultativnih saslušanja u 2017. godini, kao što se može vidjeti iz grafika, je ostao na približnom nivou kao i prethodnih godina.
Najbolji primjer za razumijevanje promjene u pristupu kontrolnoj funkciji Skupštine predstavlja Odbor za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet. U prethodnoj godini ovaj odbor nije održao nijedno kontrolno saslušanje. Da podsjetimo, Odbor su činili isključivo poslanici vladajuće koalicije. Ukoliko to uporedimo sa 2016. godinom, kada ne samo da su opozicioni poslanici aktivno učestvovali u radu odbora, već je i na samom čelu odbora bio predstavnik opozicije primjetićemo značajnu razliku. Naime ovaj Odbor je održao 5 kontrolnih saslušanja u 2016. godini, dakle polovinu od ukupnog broja održanih saslušanja. Uz to, na svim saslušanjima su učestvovali i ministri u Vladi, i to finansija, kulture, zdravstva, održivog razvoja i turizma. Prema tome, očigledno je u ovom odboru došlo do jasnog pada zainteresovanosti za vršenje kontrole nad radom izvršne vlasti. Odbor za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet je održao tri konsultativna saslušanja, što je predstavlja rast u odnosu na godinu ranije, s tim što su dva od ta tri saslušanja dio zakonom predviđene procedure za imenovanje na javnu funkciju. Preostalo saslušanje koje je bilo tematskog karaktera, odbor nije realizovao sam, već na zajedničkoj sjednici sa Odborom za turizam, poljoprivredu, ekologiju i prostorno planiranje.
Sa druge strane, na primjeru Odbora za politički sistem, pravosuđe i upravu možemo vidjeti da su odstupanja u radu manja kod onih odbora koje su i u ranijem periodu, prije opozicionog bojkota, vodili poslanici vladajuće većine. Ipak, nedostatak korektivnog faktora je vidljiv i u ovom slučaju, pa je tako 2017. godina bila jedina u posljednjih pet u kojoj ovaj odbor nije održao nijedno kontrolno saslušanje. Odbor je sproveo jedno konsultativno saslušanje, koje je, takođe, dio obavezne zakonske procedure za imenovanje na javnu funkciju.
Kao i kod saslušanja, razlika je manje osjetna u odborima kojima je i prije bojkota predsjedavao neko od poslanika iz vladajuće većine. Tako je Odbor za politički sistem, pravosuđe i upravu usvojio i jedan zaključak više nego godinu ranije. Ipak, analizom sadržine tih zaključaka, postavlja se pitanje koliko oni zapravo doprinose poboljšanju rada institucija, jer su dominatno sačinjeni od uopštenih konstatacija.
Filip Vicković
Istraživač u Politikon mreži
[1] Treba napomenuti da kada govorimo o broju zaključaka, tretiramo ih zajedno, bez odvajanja, zaključke sa saslušanja i zaključke sa razmatranja izvještaja o radu i drugih dokumenata.
Naslovna fotografija: zvanična internet prezentacija Skupštine Crne Gore
***
The previous year was marked by the boycott of the Parliament by the whole opposition, and at the end of the year by part of it. In these circumstances, the Parliament has seen a downgrade in the quality of how it operates, which was most evident in how it exercise its control function. A fall in instrument usage that are at the disposal for MPs for supervising the work of the legislative branch is noticeable. The number of control hearings in 2017 has fallen by 90% when compared to 2016. What needs to be taken into consideration is that in the meantime the interim committee, which supervised investigations related to cases of threats to security of journalists and media, had one control hearing and eventually ceased to exist. In all means, this does not change the fact that the reduction of the number of hearings is much higher than one would expect in regular circumstances. Another indicator that shows changes in how the Parliament is performing its control function is the implementation of control hearings by only one committee in 2017, namely the Committee for international relations and emigrants, which is downgrade from 6 committees that used this control mechanism in 2016. We note that even the only control hearing during the last year resulted in solely technical conclusions. This is a very illustrative example of the negative effect caused by the opposition boycott on the control function of the Parliament, especially if one takes into consideration that more than half of the control hearings in 2016 were done in committees which were chaired by opposition MPs.
The number of consultative hearings in 2017, as it can be seen in the graphic below, has remained at almost the same level as during the previous years.
In the effort to elaborate how the Parliament of Montenegro performs its control function, we will focus on the performance of two committees in 2017. These are the Committee for economy, finance and budget and Committee for the political system, judiciary and administration. Another reason for choosing these two committees is the possibility for comparison between the committees where the MPs of the ruling majority and opposition chaired.
The best example for understanding how the control function of the parliament changed is the Committee for economy, finance and budget. In the last year, this committee hasn’t held a single control hearing. This committee consisted of only MPs from the ruling coalition. If we compare this to 2016, when not only the opposition MPs were active, but also the president of the committee was from the opposition, there are significant difference to be seen. In 2016, this committee has had 5 control hearings, which accounted half of the overall number of hearings. With that, on all hearings there were government ministers present, most notably ministers for culture, health care, sustainable development and tourism. Therefore, it is evident that there has been a clear fall in the interest for performing the control on the legislative branch. Committee for economy, finance and budget has held three consultative hearings, which is an increase compared to the year before, albeit two of those three were part of the legal procedure intended for appointments on public positions. The remaining hearing was more of a thematic character, which the committee organised together with the Committee for tourism, agriculture, ecology and spatial planning.
On the other hand, on the example of the Committee for the political system, judiciary and administration, one can notice less deviation in those committees that were, even before the boycott of the opposition, led by the MPs of the ruling majority. However, the lack of corrective factor is noticeable in this example too, hence why 2017 was the only in the last five years in which this committee hasn’t held a single control hearing. Chamber has held one consultative hearing, which is also part of the mandatory legal procedure for appointments on public positions.
To further elaborate on how the parliament has seen a downgrade in the quality of exercising its control function, we will take a look on the conclusions that the committees adopted and suggested on plenums for final adoption. This refers to the number, as well as the quality of the conclusions. The best example can be found in the Committee for economy, finance and budget. The overall number of conclusions adopted in 2017 is down by one-third when compared with the previous year. There are two reasons that prove this. First of all, as it was already mentioned, in 2017 there were no control hearings, whereas in 2016 there were five. The second reason is that every report on how the institutions operated, on which the committee declared its opinion, was followed by one conclusion which only stated that the report is either adopted or accepted. That differs significantly from the praxis of the previous parliament convocation, when the committee passed concrete conclusion off substantial importance for improving the work of institutions, which were dominantly proposed by opposition MPs. A great example for this can been seen when the report when the work of the Commission for concessions was discussed. In 2016, the discussion about this report led to seven conclusions, which were proposed by two opposition MPs that were intended for further improvement of the work of the Commission or the current state of affairs in the field of concessions. In 2017 however, the Committee hasn’t even come out with the conclusions that were made during the discussion about the report on the Commission.
As with the hearings, there is less noticeable difference in those committees which were, even before the opposition boycott, chaired by MPs from the ruling coalition. Therefore, Committee for the political system, judiciary and administration has adopted one conclusion more than the year before. However, when analysing the contents of these conclusions, one must take into consideration on how they contribute to the betterment of the work of institutions, since they are dominantly composed of generalised statements.
Therefore, we can conclude that 2017 wasn’t a year in which the Parliament hasn’t, at least in a quality or efficient way, performed its control function over the other government branches. On the contrary, the reports on the work of institutions passed through parliament committees without constructive debates, whereas the hearings, with rare exceptions, were just a procedural formality. The negative effect caused by the opposition boycott of the parliament was especially evident in those committees where opposition MPs used to chair. This is all thanks to the lack of real control over the institutions, which without the efficient use of mechanisms of parliament supervision, won’t become more responsible and developed.
Filip Vicković
Researcher at Politikon Network
Cover: official internet presentation of the Parliament of Montenegro
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